Trust · Warrant canary
If this bird stops singing,
you should know why.
The canary is alive.
As of 3 November 2026, Deniable has received no gag orders, no FISA orders and no secret demands for user data from any government.
Next statement due in
Due 2026-12-01 00:00 UTC · expires 2026-12-08 00:00 UTC
Proof it was written after
- Bitcoin block
- #974,409
- Block hash
- BTC at signing
- $77,323.00
Live now
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View the signed statementPGP 7934 6962 FD9B 496B 8900 1123 45F8 08AE F362 6ADB
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 DENIABLE LLC WARRANT CANARY Issued: 2026-11-03 16:29 UTC Next due: 2026-12-01 00:00 UTC Expires: 2026-12-08 00:00 UTC As of the date above, Deniable LLC has not received: * a National Security Letter * an order under the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) * a secret order under any other country’s surveillance law, such as a UK technical capability notice * a gag order, or any request that came with a requirement to keep it secret * a request to weaken, backdoor or alter DeniableOS, its encryption or its updates * a warrant from any government for user data If no new statement replaces this one before it expires, assume that something has happened which we are not allowed to describe. Transparency report: every report published so far is sealed by this chain hash (https://deniable.io/transparency-report): 20815657c62dea2c8bf52a0d27fbe28f964b2f7f4f6fa18ea71d9abab6cc695d Proof this statement was not written in advance: Bitcoin block 974409 00000000000000000000c64b1aad7c56ed880645b2be73fb8380bb7919ede29f BTC/USD at signing: 77323 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iJEEARYKADkWIQR5NGli/ZtJa4kAESNF+Aiu82Jq2wUCauoNXRsUgAAAAAAEAA5t YW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwwLDMACgkQRfgIrvNiatv/LAD/VwoQwCq3BlZvR5o9y8Rw qe0QwpJzCsKtIHMXjiOIyegBAIHXFuO04W4jZDv+wclb8ZWI6yZ1r8cJHgykUQC+ 78QF =BGfz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Download statement and our public key, then check it with gpg --verify statement.asc
What is a warrant canary?
Coal miners once carried canaries underground. The birds were more sensitive to toxic gas than people, so when a canary stopped singing, the miners knew to get out before they could smell anything wrong.
A warrant canary does the same job for secret government orders. It is a public statement that something has not happened: no gag order, no secret warrant, no request to hand over user data quietly. It stays true only while it keeps being renewed. One of the earliest was a sign in a Vermont library in 2005 that read simply, “The FBI has not been here.” If the sign ever came down, patrons would know.
How ours works
A canary that renews itself proves nothing. Ours depends on a person choosing to renew it.
Signed by hand, every month
On the first of each month a named person at Deniable checks that no secret order has arrived, then signs a fresh statement with our published PGP key.
Anchored to something no one can predict
Each statement includes the hash of a recent Bitcoin block. Nobody can know that hash in advance, so a statement cannot be written early and left on a timer.
Built to expire
Every statement carries a deadline. If the countdown reaches zero and no new statement appears, the canary dies. Assume we have been served with an order we cannot talk about, and that we chose silence over telling you something false.
The legal logic
Some government demands arrive with a duty of silence attached. In the United States, where Deniable LLC is based, National Security Letters and orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act can forbid a company from telling anyone it received them. Other countries have their own versions, such as notices under the UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
A government can order a company to stay silent. Ordering it to keep publishing a statement it knows to be false is a very different demand. A warrant canary sits in that gap: we never announce an order, we simply stop saying that there has not been one.
We want to be straight about the limits. No court in any country has ruled on whether letting a canary lapse breaks a gag order. A dead canary cannot tell you which order arrived, who sent it or what it asked for. And it does not mean your data was handed over: it means that something happened which we are not allowed to describe.
Why we do this
DeniableOS exists because people are pressured to hand over what is on their phones. It would be a strange promise if we asked you to trust a phone built for that pressure while staying vague about the pressure on us.
We keep as little as we can. The installed OS sends no analytics, and we hold only the account and licence details that billing and support need. The canary covers the rest: if anyone ever tries to force us to weaken DeniableOS or reach the people who use it, you will not hear it from us, but you will see the bird go quiet.
What we can tell you
The canary covers what we cannot talk about. Everything we can talk about goes in our quarterly transparency report: every automated DMCA request and every inquiry from a government institution, published in a log that is never edited afterward.